The Province has reported that “Canadians driving into the U.S. or arriving by sea are now required to have government-issued photo ID and proof of citizenship” as part of the new regulations under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative driven by the U.S. The changes mark a renewed focus on border issues between Canada and the U.S. and the pressure on provincial, state and federal governments to adopt enhanced identity-based security measures.
Unfortunately, no one seems to be asking whether enhanced measures actually enhance national security. In fact, the rush to implement costly technologies with no analysis of identity as the fundamental basis for security should be alarming. With reoccurring claims that biometrics and self-scanning kiosks will not just nab criminals but prevent terrorism, further analysis of what identity is and how it is established should be conducted and publicly disclosed.
Of course, the findings of such a study would likely go against prevalent thinking in the field of security and would directly lead to a grinding halt on billions being spent on measures that can’t fulfill the promises attached to them. Many might ask, how would asking questions about security that threaten to turn an entire industry upside down help increase security? Simple, continuing blindly promising false-security to millions of people, spending billions of tax-payer dollars on faulty measures will undermine security in ways that rethinking security never could. The good-faith of the masses once lost will be lost forever. As we have reported before security is dependent on co-operative citizenry – lose that symbiosis, and lose security.
The flaws of an identity-based proactive national security scheme are simple and obvious:
1.) Individuals who pose a threat but have no previous criminal record will pass undetected,
2.) False official identities can be established, particularly if the official identity was established in or the supporting documents used to establish the official identity come from another country; and
3.) The intent of an individual to commit a crime cannot be determined through automated identity based systems, whereas a border guard might detect some nuances in an individual’s behaviour.
As a result, the argument, that biometrics and electronic documents are solutions that prevent terrorism, is faulty. If we continue to ignore this fact, implementing ever-more measures based on faulty-reasoning, our state of security (and public faith in the system) will be damaged beyond repair.
For more information on the problems with identity as a basis for security read Identity in Security: The Problem With Billy.
International Perspectives 